Introduction
In 1996 China by sponsored the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), consisting of four adjoining countries: Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. The SCO started as a cooperative organisation with a focus on countering drug-smuggling and terrorism. Later, the SCO invited Uzbekistan to join, even though it does not abut China. In 2003, the SCO broadened its scope by including regional economic cooperation in its charter. That, in turn, granted observer status to Pakistan, India, and Mongolia — all adjoining China, and Iran which does not. SCO has evolved from Shanghai Five grouping to include a range of security and economic issues. There are many overlapping structures in the fields of security and economy in SCO which has the effect of diluting the unity of purpose and missions as envisaged in SCO charter.
In this uncertain and dynamic environment where each member is looking to maximise its gains from evolving situation, achieving cooperation amongst the members would be a complex task. Has it been able to gain credibility as a security provider to the Central Asian Region (CAR)? Is it poised to enlarge its scope and missions? Is it moving towards becoming a military alliance or will it remain an anti-terrorist coalition? How can it promote better economic integration between its member states and other regional groupings? How can it promote cooperation rather than competition especially for hydrocarbon and other resources in the region? It is critical to examine the degree of success which SCO has achieved so far in the roles set out by it.
The Maturing of SCO
Uzbekistan’s entrance to the club of five signified that the grouping had enlarged its interests to strategic cooperation in the region and had progressed beyond the border security issues. In the last six years, SCO has matured and acquired the ability to deal with the problems bedeviling the CAR and its neighborhood. However, it is still to achieve the required degree of credibility as a multi-lateral structure. In the post Cold War era, after dissolution of Soviet Union, American intervention in Afghanistan was the second most defining event.
The SCO members were happy to accommodate the American interests because Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) also addressed their concerns on terrorism, and instability being exported from Afghanistan, and Pakistan. During heydays of Taliban regime (1996-2001), Afghanistan and Pakistan had become epicenters of terrorism with sanctuaries and training facilities being provided to likes of Al Qaeda, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and holy warriors from Chechnya and CAR countries. Islamic militant groups of all hues had found ready sanctuaries in these countries and established effective terror infrastructure in these countries. Even China felt threatened from fundamentalist Muslim elements because of its proximity to Pakistan and vulnerabilities in Xingjian.
Russia and China raised no objections to the US being granted air bases and logistics facilities for OEF by Central Asian nations since it suited their strategic interests. SCO at this stage was in infancy and did not present a credible and coordinated alternative against security threats. Both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan had pro-western orientation and were keen to obtain economic and security dividends from their association with the West through various groupings like NATO’s Partnership for Peace Programme. However, by the time SCO summit of 2005 took place a variety of factors resulted in SCO asking the USA to set a timeline for withdrawal of their bases from CAR. This declaration was one of the first steps towards assertion by the SCO as a multilateral institution on security issues.
Decline of Western Influence
Aggressive democratic practices by the USA and policy of extreme unilateralism in pursuance of its national interests led to disenchantment of CAR countries. As a throwback to Andijon violence of May 2005 in Uzbekistan and severe criticism of the Uzbek government actions by the USA; Americans were asked to vacate their base in Uzbekistan. This call was also echoed by the SCO in July 2005 which required US to vacate its bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Tajikistan also provides the USA military and NATO fly-over rights and a small contingent of French troops is based there for OEF. Kyrgyzstan had also demanded vacation of its air base by the USA but agreed to extend the lease with multifold increase of the lease money. By 2005, Central Asian countries had realised that envisaged economic benefits from the West were not substantial and were contingent upon many conditions including promotion of democratic norms as interpreted by the EU and the US.
SCO summit in July 2005 was important because it brought in India, Iran and Pakistan as observers, thus expanding its geographical reach and adding the possibilities of improved cooperation on economic and security affairs. Admission of the aforesaid observers in 2005 and Mongolia in 2004 may have resulted from some degree of confidence that SCO’s strategic and economic interests could expand beyond CAR. Though America and the West continue to exercise substantial influence in CAR affairs, 2005 marked the beginning of decline of the strategic influence of the USA in CAR.
SCO’s summit in Beijing in June 2006 was noteworthy for many reasons. It emphasised the leading role of China in imparting direction to the organisation. Documents signed included a joint communiqué on closer cooperation, a statement on information security, a resolution on fighting terrorism, separatism and extremism from 2007 to 2009, an agreement on joint terrorism actions among member countries and cutting off of infiltration channels of terrorists, extremists and separatists. Joint declaration also indicated determination of SCO to prevent interference in its affairs by outside powers.
An important aspect of the summit was the Russian proposal for creating an energy club under the aegis of SCO. The SCO consists of both energy deficient and energy surplus members and cooperation on energy issues can be mutually beneficial to all the members and observers.
Relevance and Effectiveness of SCO
While China has been the driver of SCO, Russia created its own grouping of Central Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) in 2002, which includes all SCO members less China. Russia and China do create apprehensions among the smaller members of SCO because of their power differential between them.
Central Asian nations are still attracted towards the West for both political and economic reasons. All of them continue to pursue multi-vector policies to exploit the emerging strategic space to the maximum in furtherance of their respective national interests. For example, all CAR nations are members of Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and NATO’S ‘Partnership for Peace’ Programme. Kazakhstan is looking forward to becoming chairman of the OSCE in 2009. Uzbekistan has not given up on improving its relations with the EU and the USA. In order to assuage their concerns, Uzbek President had sacked Andijon Governor thus attempting to put the blame on local/ provincial authorities for Andijon incident. But this was not bought by the EU which continues to place restrictions on trade with that country.
The USA has become more pragmatic in criticising the deficiencies in the democratic and political processes in CAR countries. For example, the USA refrained from criticising election of Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev in November 2006 in order to gain access to hydrocarbon riches of Kazakhstan. Similarly Kyrgyzstan, where Seventh SCO summit was held in August 2007, and which is the only country where a democratic government is functioning, has been recipient of considerable economic aid from the West and the USA. USA is still maintaining a base there for its operations in Afghanistan.
The presence of Turkmenistan President at the Seventh SCO summit points towards a shift in its erstwhile policy of ‘positive neutrality’. Its membership would be a boost for the SCO since it is the only CAR nation which remains outside the group. Turkmenistan has concluded a number of agreements with both Russia and China on gas supply which point towards rising influence of Russia and China and tilting of Turkmenistan away from the USA and the West.
China’s fast economic growth and appetite for natural resources and raw materials is viewed with consternation by other SCO members and they remain wary of being exploited by a large powerful neighbor. CAR nations aspire for an all round development which is yet to take off. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have been the two most pro-west nations in CAR but in the post-Soviet era. However, the Western economic aid has not been up to their expectations. Even though the complementarities of economy exist in CAR, the goal of achieving regional economic integration and political harmonisation seems to be far away.
SCO and CSTO signed an agreement on cooperation in security affairs in Aug 2007. This has several implications on the emerging strategic situation in the CAR. First, it signifies the cementing of strategic relationship between Russia and China in the CAR. Second, this security combine encompasses a vast region from the NATO in the West to China in the East, prompting comparisons with the Warsaw Pact of the Cold War-era and can turn into a NATO of the East. Third, the CSTO is more of a defence pact with the members required to come to each others aid in certain contingencies, while the China-led SCO is not a defence pact. Both China and Russia have emphasised that the SCO has no plans to become a military bloc.
At the international and regional levels, SCO has also established relations with regional cooperative structures like ASEAN, Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and Eurasian Economic Community, besides the CSTO. During the seventh summit, SCO had proposed an Afghan Contact Group in 2005; protocol for the same was signed the next year. Because of the worsening security situation in Afghanistan and resurgence of Taliban with concomitant likely adverse effect on stability and security in CAR, SCO in its joint communiqué of August 16, 2007 has indicated the possibility of enhancing its role in the region. This may not be taken kindly by the USA or NATO; yet this is an exhibition of SCO’s willingness to be a net contributor to the regional security.
In the ultimate analysis, though SCO has come of age and has achieved a certain degree of maturity, it has yet to evolve as an effective regional organisation. It has still to achieve the required degree of harmonistion of competing interests of its members as well as interests of regional and outside powers. At the international level it has improved its image (SCO’s seventh summit was attended by United Nation’s Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Lynn Pascoe) but it is yet to be given due recognition by either the USA or NATO.
India’s Standing in the SCO
India was admitted as an observer in the SCO in its fifth summit meeting in 2005. India considers Central Asia as its strategic neighborhood and has been endeavoring to develop economic and trade relations which, to a large extent, are being hampered by lack of a direct route to CAR.
India looks at Central Asian oil to diversify its gas and oil imports. Further, India prefers stability of the current regimes and favors peaceful change rather than promotion of any aggressive democratic practices. India is, Therefore, considered a friendly partner by Central Asian states and a country which can play a balancing role in fierce power play taking place in CAR.
India shares the goals of anti-terrorism, security and stability in Central Asia along with the curtailment of drug trafficking in the region. India supports the objectives of SCO which seek to ensure stability in the region, combat terrorism and extremist view points and is keen to play constructive and active role in SCO. India favours construction of gas pipelines from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan and Pakistan to India. Turkmenistan has indicated that there is enough gas in Turkmenistan to meet the demands of Pakistan and India. From India’s point of view the formulation of SCO Energy CLUB would be beneficial, if all the members and observers are able to evolve a win-win situation and there is more cooperation than competition in the field of energy. India had lost to China in its bid for an oil contract in Kazakhstan towards end of 2005 because of some extraneous reasons.
India’s economic cooperation with CAR nations also remains at a low. Trade between Central Asia and India is largely circumscribed by the unstable situation in Afghanistan and obtuse policies of Pakistan in not allowing the Indian goods to pass through its territory. The need to develop a North-South Transit corridor, which provides a shorter and more efficient trade route to Russia and landlocked Central Asia, can not be overemphasised.
There is also a moratorium placed on admission of new members in the SCO. Unlike Iran and Pakistan, India has not expressed any intention of becoming a member of SCO. India would do well to abstain from full membership, if it perceives SCO evolving into a military alliance.
Conclusion
SCO has acquired increased confidence and prominence as a multilateral organisation. Even though it has shared goals of stamping out terrorism, extremism and radicalism in the region with other organisations like NATO, it is not seen as a complimentary security structure by the NATO or the USA.
In 1996 China by sponsored the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), consisting of four adjoining countries: Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. The SCO started as a cooperative organisation with a focus on countering drug-smuggling and terrorism. Later, the SCO invited Uzbekistan to join, even though it does not abut China. In 2003, the SCO broadened its scope by including regional economic cooperation in its charter. That, in turn, granted observer status to Pakistan, India, and Mongolia — all adjoining China, and Iran which does not. SCO has evolved from Shanghai Five grouping to include a range of security and economic issues. There are many overlapping structures in the fields of security and economy in SCO which has the effect of diluting the unity of purpose and missions as envisaged in SCO charter.
In this uncertain and dynamic environment where each member is looking to maximise its gains from evolving situation, achieving cooperation amongst the members would be a complex task. Has it been able to gain credibility as a security provider to the Central Asian Region (CAR)? Is it poised to enlarge its scope and missions? Is it moving towards becoming a military alliance or will it remain an anti-terrorist coalition? How can it promote better economic integration between its member states and other regional groupings? How can it promote cooperation rather than competition especially for hydrocarbon and other resources in the region? It is critical to examine the degree of success which SCO has achieved so far in the roles set out by it.
The Maturing of SCO
Uzbekistan’s entrance to the club of five signified that the grouping had enlarged its interests to strategic cooperation in the region and had progressed beyond the border security issues. In the last six years, SCO has matured and acquired the ability to deal with the problems bedeviling the CAR and its neighborhood. However, it is still to achieve the required degree of credibility as a multi-lateral structure. In the post Cold War era, after dissolution of Soviet Union, American intervention in Afghanistan was the second most defining event.
The SCO members were happy to accommodate the American interests because Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) also addressed their concerns on terrorism, and instability being exported from Afghanistan, and Pakistan. During heydays of Taliban regime (1996-2001), Afghanistan and Pakistan had become epicenters of terrorism with sanctuaries and training facilities being provided to likes of Al Qaeda, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and holy warriors from Chechnya and CAR countries. Islamic militant groups of all hues had found ready sanctuaries in these countries and established effective terror infrastructure in these countries. Even China felt threatened from fundamentalist Muslim elements because of its proximity to Pakistan and vulnerabilities in Xingjian.
Russia and China raised no objections to the US being granted air bases and logistics facilities for OEF by Central Asian nations since it suited their strategic interests. SCO at this stage was in infancy and did not present a credible and coordinated alternative against security threats. Both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan had pro-western orientation and were keen to obtain economic and security dividends from their association with the West through various groupings like NATO’s Partnership for Peace Programme. However, by the time SCO summit of 2005 took place a variety of factors resulted in SCO asking the USA to set a timeline for withdrawal of their bases from CAR. This declaration was one of the first steps towards assertion by the SCO as a multilateral institution on security issues.
Decline of Western Influence
Aggressive democratic practices by the USA and policy of extreme unilateralism in pursuance of its national interests led to disenchantment of CAR countries. As a throwback to Andijon violence of May 2005 in Uzbekistan and severe criticism of the Uzbek government actions by the USA; Americans were asked to vacate their base in Uzbekistan. This call was also echoed by the SCO in July 2005 which required US to vacate its bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Tajikistan also provides the USA military and NATO fly-over rights and a small contingent of French troops is based there for OEF. Kyrgyzstan had also demanded vacation of its air base by the USA but agreed to extend the lease with multifold increase of the lease money. By 2005, Central Asian countries had realised that envisaged economic benefits from the West were not substantial and were contingent upon many conditions including promotion of democratic norms as interpreted by the EU and the US.
SCO summit in July 2005 was important because it brought in India, Iran and Pakistan as observers, thus expanding its geographical reach and adding the possibilities of improved cooperation on economic and security affairs. Admission of the aforesaid observers in 2005 and Mongolia in 2004 may have resulted from some degree of confidence that SCO’s strategic and economic interests could expand beyond CAR. Though America and the West continue to exercise substantial influence in CAR affairs, 2005 marked the beginning of decline of the strategic influence of the USA in CAR.
SCO’s summit in Beijing in June 2006 was noteworthy for many reasons. It emphasised the leading role of China in imparting direction to the organisation. Documents signed included a joint communiqué on closer cooperation, a statement on information security, a resolution on fighting terrorism, separatism and extremism from 2007 to 2009, an agreement on joint terrorism actions among member countries and cutting off of infiltration channels of terrorists, extremists and separatists. Joint declaration also indicated determination of SCO to prevent interference in its affairs by outside powers.
An important aspect of the summit was the Russian proposal for creating an energy club under the aegis of SCO. The SCO consists of both energy deficient and energy surplus members and cooperation on energy issues can be mutually beneficial to all the members and observers.
Relevance and Effectiveness of SCO
While China has been the driver of SCO, Russia created its own grouping of Central Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) in 2002, which includes all SCO members less China. Russia and China do create apprehensions among the smaller members of SCO because of their power differential between them.
Central Asian nations are still attracted towards the West for both political and economic reasons. All of them continue to pursue multi-vector policies to exploit the emerging strategic space to the maximum in furtherance of their respective national interests. For example, all CAR nations are members of Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and NATO’S ‘Partnership for Peace’ Programme. Kazakhstan is looking forward to becoming chairman of the OSCE in 2009. Uzbekistan has not given up on improving its relations with the EU and the USA. In order to assuage their concerns, Uzbek President had sacked Andijon Governor thus attempting to put the blame on local/ provincial authorities for Andijon incident. But this was not bought by the EU which continues to place restrictions on trade with that country.
The USA has become more pragmatic in criticising the deficiencies in the democratic and political processes in CAR countries. For example, the USA refrained from criticising election of Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev in November 2006 in order to gain access to hydrocarbon riches of Kazakhstan. Similarly Kyrgyzstan, where Seventh SCO summit was held in August 2007, and which is the only country where a democratic government is functioning, has been recipient of considerable economic aid from the West and the USA. USA is still maintaining a base there for its operations in Afghanistan.
The presence of Turkmenistan President at the Seventh SCO summit points towards a shift in its erstwhile policy of ‘positive neutrality’. Its membership would be a boost for the SCO since it is the only CAR nation which remains outside the group. Turkmenistan has concluded a number of agreements with both Russia and China on gas supply which point towards rising influence of Russia and China and tilting of Turkmenistan away from the USA and the West.
China’s fast economic growth and appetite for natural resources and raw materials is viewed with consternation by other SCO members and they remain wary of being exploited by a large powerful neighbor. CAR nations aspire for an all round development which is yet to take off. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have been the two most pro-west nations in CAR but in the post-Soviet era. However, the Western economic aid has not been up to their expectations. Even though the complementarities of economy exist in CAR, the goal of achieving regional economic integration and political harmonisation seems to be far away.
SCO and CSTO signed an agreement on cooperation in security affairs in Aug 2007. This has several implications on the emerging strategic situation in the CAR. First, it signifies the cementing of strategic relationship between Russia and China in the CAR. Second, this security combine encompasses a vast region from the NATO in the West to China in the East, prompting comparisons with the Warsaw Pact of the Cold War-era and can turn into a NATO of the East. Third, the CSTO is more of a defence pact with the members required to come to each others aid in certain contingencies, while the China-led SCO is not a defence pact. Both China and Russia have emphasised that the SCO has no plans to become a military bloc.
At the international and regional levels, SCO has also established relations with regional cooperative structures like ASEAN, Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and Eurasian Economic Community, besides the CSTO. During the seventh summit, SCO had proposed an Afghan Contact Group in 2005; protocol for the same was signed the next year. Because of the worsening security situation in Afghanistan and resurgence of Taliban with concomitant likely adverse effect on stability and security in CAR, SCO in its joint communiqué of August 16, 2007 has indicated the possibility of enhancing its role in the region. This may not be taken kindly by the USA or NATO; yet this is an exhibition of SCO’s willingness to be a net contributor to the regional security.
In the ultimate analysis, though SCO has come of age and has achieved a certain degree of maturity, it has yet to evolve as an effective regional organisation. It has still to achieve the required degree of harmonistion of competing interests of its members as well as interests of regional and outside powers. At the international level it has improved its image (SCO’s seventh summit was attended by United Nation’s Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Lynn Pascoe) but it is yet to be given due recognition by either the USA or NATO.
India’s Standing in the SCO
India was admitted as an observer in the SCO in its fifth summit meeting in 2005. India considers Central Asia as its strategic neighborhood and has been endeavoring to develop economic and trade relations which, to a large extent, are being hampered by lack of a direct route to CAR.
India looks at Central Asian oil to diversify its gas and oil imports. Further, India prefers stability of the current regimes and favors peaceful change rather than promotion of any aggressive democratic practices. India is, Therefore, considered a friendly partner by Central Asian states and a country which can play a balancing role in fierce power play taking place in CAR.
India shares the goals of anti-terrorism, security and stability in Central Asia along with the curtailment of drug trafficking in the region. India supports the objectives of SCO which seek to ensure stability in the region, combat terrorism and extremist view points and is keen to play constructive and active role in SCO. India favours construction of gas pipelines from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan and Pakistan to India. Turkmenistan has indicated that there is enough gas in Turkmenistan to meet the demands of Pakistan and India. From India’s point of view the formulation of SCO Energy CLUB would be beneficial, if all the members and observers are able to evolve a win-win situation and there is more cooperation than competition in the field of energy. India had lost to China in its bid for an oil contract in Kazakhstan towards end of 2005 because of some extraneous reasons.
India’s economic cooperation with CAR nations also remains at a low. Trade between Central Asia and India is largely circumscribed by the unstable situation in Afghanistan and obtuse policies of Pakistan in not allowing the Indian goods to pass through its territory. The need to develop a North-South Transit corridor, which provides a shorter and more efficient trade route to Russia and landlocked Central Asia, can not be overemphasised.
There is also a moratorium placed on admission of new members in the SCO. Unlike Iran and Pakistan, India has not expressed any intention of becoming a member of SCO. India would do well to abstain from full membership, if it perceives SCO evolving into a military alliance.
Conclusion
SCO has acquired increased confidence and prominence as a multilateral organisation. Even though it has shared goals of stamping out terrorism, extremism and radicalism in the region with other organisations like NATO, it is not seen as a complimentary security structure by the NATO or the USA.
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