Background
In the early 1940s, the Muslim League rejected the idea of the Indian sub-continent being governed by a constitution, which enshrined secular values. It pressed for partition of India and, under the leadership of Mr Mohammed Ali Jinnah, took the communal path and proclaimed that it was the sole representative of Muslims in the subcontinent. Muslims who supported the secular Congress Party were branded as Hindu chamchas [yes men] and traitors to Islam. By this logic, Pakistan claimed that Jammu and Kashmir being a Muslim majority state should be part of Pakistan. Thousands of armed Pakistani guerrillas crossed the border into the Kashmir valley. They were under the illusion that one Pakistani was equal to ten Indians. Their slogan was “Has kar liya Pakistan, lar kar lenge Hindustan”. The trucks in which they came were marked ‘Chalo Delhi’.
After a thorough beating, when the Indian Army was poised to clear the whole of Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan accepted a United Nations cease fire. This was to be followed by a withdrawal of Pakistani forces and a United Nations (UN)-supervised plebiscite to decide the will of the people. Pakistan was afraid to allow a plebiscite to be held as they knew that Shiekh Abdullah and his National Conference party would sweep the polls. Thus, Pakistan refused to withdraw and no plebiscite could be held. Pakistani propaganda kept repeating that India was refusing a plebiscite. However, Jinnah saw the reality and on his deathbed admitted to his doctor that the creation of Pakistan was the biggest disaster of his life.
The Indo-Pak Wars
Pakistan realized that its armed forces were too weak for them to force a military solution in Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan joined US-led anti-Soviet military pacts. In return, it received significant military supplies. By 1964, Pakistan's armed forces had a military edge over India in three vital areas: the air force, armour and artillery. This once again fired their illusions. Mr Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, persuaded President Ayub Khan to focus attention on Jammu and Kashmir as there was little risk of provoking a military show down. Indian Prime Minister Shastri warned Pakistan that any violations of the Cease Fire Line (CFL) would be treated as a violation of the international border and India would be compelled to take appropriate action to counter this.
Ignoring his warning, Pakistan launched an armoured division across the CFL, captured Chhamb, threatened Akhnur and the road communications from Jammu to Naushera and Poonch. On 6th September 1965, Shastri ordered the Armed Forces to counter this aggression and cross the international border if necessary. The Indo-Pak War of 1965 resulted in a military and political defeat for Pakistan. In the battles which ensued, Pakistan lost the cream of its armour in the Punjab. Pakistan's political aims had been countered. An emergency was declared in Pakistan. President Ayub Khan resigned. A UN imposed cease fire resulted in the re-establishment of a mutually agreed Cease Fire Line [CFL].
Pakistani propaganda claimed that India had wanted to overrun Pakistan and that their aggressive plans had been crushed. This illusion is perpetuated to this day, and 6th September is celebrated as "Save Pakistan Day". But Pakistani generals know the reality. They know that they cannot defeat India militarily. They have decided to "bleed" India by arming and training terrorists in occupied Jammu and Kashmir, and employing them for trans-border terror attacks. Pakistani propaganda claims these people to be freedom fighters. That explains the existence of terror infrastructure inside areas under Pakistani control.
Meanwhile, it had become apparent that there were strong cultural differences between East and West Pakistan, which could not be overcome by Islam. When the East Pakistani electorate, led by Mujibur Rehman, gained a lead over West Pakistan's Muslim League, the latter was not prepared to accept Mujibur Rehman as the Prime Minister. The President proclaimed martial law in East Pakistan, appointed Bhutto as Prime Minister, arrested Mujibur Rehman and began arresting and killing Bengali intellectuals and other prominent leaders.
Millions of Bengali refugees poured across the border into India where a provisional Bangladesh government in exile was established. Bengali guerrillas were recruited, organised, armed and trained. Soon the whole of East Pakistan was up in arms. Pakistani military positions were isolated and were faced with an impossible military task. Forces in West Pakistan, out of sheer desperation, launched futile air attacks across the western border against targets in India. In the ensuing Indo-Pak War of 1971, Pakistani armed forces in East Pakistan capitulated. 93,000 prisoners were evacuated to prison camps in India. East Pakistan was proclaimed as a sovereign state, Bangladesh. India declared a unilateral cease fire.
Bhutto released Mujibur Rehman and began negotiating for the repatriation of 93,000 prisoners of war. India demanded that the CFL be demarcated by a joint team. India wanted this to be treated as an international border, but Bhutto apparently pleaded that this decision be delayed until he had consolidated his position in Pakistan. India agreed and the prisoners were repatriated; the CFL was thereafter referred to as the Line of Control [LOC]. The Pakistani military was subdued after this defeat in Bangladesh but it was not prepared to allow Bhutto to consolidate his political power. Bhutto's opponents accused him of murdering a political rival. Bhutto was arrested, tried, found guilty and hanged. The military once again became the power behind the political throne in Islamabad.
Rise of SectarianismPartition had deeply affected the demographic balance of some areas of Pakistan. The majority of the migrants who went from India were Sunnis who were either serving in the armed forces or working as farm laborers. Many started working on the farms of Pakistani Shia landlords. Their poverty led to deep resentments and created an angry group deprived of resources and political representation.
Fearful of Shia activism following the 1978-79 Islamic revolution in Iran, General Zia Ul Haq inflamed Sunni fears and militarised Sunni militants. With the praiseworthy exception of Nawaz Sharif, all successive Pakistani governments have continued to manipulate sectarian tension for political purposes. With the assistance of Inter-Services Intelligence [ISI] successive governments also used sectarian elements to sustain Pakistan's interests in the conflicts in Jammu and Kashmir and Afghanistan. The Army has been accused of having encouraged sectarian conflict, which it can no longer control. Yet careful examination shows that the army has always been able to maintain sectarian violence at an acceptable level by fostering infighting between groups and even eliminating key leaders whenever an organisation or individual became too difficult to control.
Army’s Hold on Power
Historically the Army has been able to remain in full control of the country since 1947 in one form or the other. It has occasionally withdrawn behind the scenes whenever it could not fulfill the economic, social and political expectations of society or when the Army suffered a major military set back as happened in 1971 when East Pakistan broke away from Pakistan and became Bangladesh. But the Army never really gave up power. After every crisis the Army was able to control power while civilians had to bear the burden of governance.
The military regime formed an alliance with religious organisations and made them an integral part of the military system of dominance. Thus, the emergence of the Muttahid Majlis-e-Ammal MMA (a combination of several religious organisations) as a political force in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) did not impose any constraints on the government. On the contrary, the MMA split the votes of the other political parties and allowed Musharraf to pass the constitutional amendments necessary to transform the parliamentary system into a presidential one and institutionalise the political role of the army through creation of a National Security Council.
Although General Pervez Musharraf's role as a liberal moderniser is accepted by many, we should not exaggerate the dangers, which could arise by the possible assassination of the General. Notwithstanding the human tragedy of such a loss, his absence is unlikely to shift the power centre of the country. A suitable relief would be found by the military. The policies on Jammu and Kashmir and Afghanistan would continue and security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons would remain under army control.
Illusion of Democracy
The military knows that the illusion of formal democracy is an essential facade when it deals with the west. It, therefore, perpetuates a political party system and elections. The military continues to hold the reins of government while letting politicians deal with the difficulties of governance. Thus, free and fair elections and the formal transfer of power to a civilian head of state, though a necessary first step in the restoration of democracy, will by itself not result in the democratisation of the country. After they form a government, civilians will face an almost impossible task of balancing the priorities of civilian politics with the "demands" of the military. Lacking true autonomy, civilians will not be able to perform better than the military. At the same time, civil helplessness in the face of orchestrated sectarian violence will reinforce the army's role as the only institution able to physically control it. This is one of the main reasons why democratic politics have been repeatedly discredited in Pakistan.
Prominent Pakistani politicians have understood this. In May 2006, long time exiled rivals Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif got together in London and signed a "Charter to Democracy" for their country. This Charter envisages bringing the military under civilian control, disbanding the National Security Council, bringing the defence budget under parliamentary oversight and throwing out military officers who occupy civilian posts. An independent election commission would conduct polls and independence of the judiciary would be restored. This effort, if accompanied by sustained economic growth, will result in the emergence of a substantial middle class with a democratic character. It is this element that is likely to demand more participatory governance and evolve a democratic tradition. Significantly, the MMA has accepted reality and also declared its support for the Charter.
General Musharraf's position has been eroded considerably since his coup in October 1999. His propaganda machine is finding it difficult to project him as a knight out on a mission to rid Pakistan of corrupt politicians, or to rid the country of internal sectarian violence or to protect Pakistan from Indian aggression. Terrorists in Jammu and Kashmir can no longer pretend that they are freedom fighters and that their violence is directed at assisting the political aspirations of the people. Kashmiris have begun to see the reality of their situation. They have at last understood that Pakistan's game plan undermines their prosperity, without achieving any political gains. The West too has understood that the risk of an Islamist take over in Pakistan is a myth created by the military to consolidate its hold on power. Propaganda on all these connected issues no longer works.
The Army knows that it can no longer rely on full support from Sind, Baluchistan or the North Western Frontier Province (NWFP). It clings to the illusion that as long as Punjab continues to remain pro-army, and it can prevent the exiled politicians from establishing a working coalition, there is little that they can do to oust the army. To dispel this illusion, the opposition must sweep the polls and make the Charter work. Politicians have one big advantage. The common man has dispelled many old illusions. The army's propaganda machine no longer works.
Musharraf knows that this is a battle for the hearts and minds of the people. This is an internal struggle for power and Pakistani strategists will welcome an opportunity to somehow involve India. By supporting the opposition, India would be playing into the Army's hands. This would help the military to win public support on the grounds of national security against their arch rivals – devious Hindu infidels who want to break up Pakistan.
Erstwhile Pakistan Army Chief General Aslam Beg had publicly announced that any threat to Pakistan's security, no matter by whom, would evoke a nuclear strike against India. Could an internal political "threat" against military authoritarianism be treated as an Indian inspired threat? It is difficult to know what desperate power hungry generals will do when they sense that they are losing power. It is necessary that Indian Armed forces be prepared for any eventuality. At the same time it would be prudent to remind Pakistan that in the event of a nuclear threat, India has the power to wipe out Pakistan.
Pakistan Army's best bet would be to avoid a direct confrontation with India and continue sponsoring terrorist attacks. The aim is to provoke communal riots, create several mini-Pakistans within India and to prove to their people that secular governance doesn't work in India. India's response to this is to keep cool and improve its intelligence and security, and deal swiftly with those who plan and execute such attacks.
The Rising Baloch Insurgency
On 26 August 2006, Pakistan army launched a heliborne commando raid on a Baloch stronghold north-west of Quetta. The ensuing battle left Nawab Akbar Bugti, his guards and about 20 Pakistani soldiers dead. This incident has given a fresh lease of life to Balochistan's long simmering insurgency and put further strain on Pakistan's fragile nation state. It is clearly not in India's interest to get involved with Balochistan insurgency.
Indian Options
Under these circumstances, India should not only continue its "peace talks" with Pakistan but should prepare and plan for a post-Musharraf future and an inevitable structural change in Pakistan. Cynics will scoff at the talk of democracy in Pakistan. The question is not whether Pakistan will forever be under the thumb of the Army but whether India is preparing itself for inevitable changes in Pakistan.
Like all the other friends of Pakistan, India too must insist on an electoral process being 'free and fair'. These small steps could set the tone for a more assertive Indian policy towards Pakistan that will benefit the people of both countries
India is rightly taking pains to ensure that its empathy for the Baloch cause does not give an opportunity to Islamabad to either discredit the movement or divide opposition leaders by laying them open to the charge that they are toe-ing the Indian line.
While adopting a realistic approach towards Pakistan, India would do well to further develop strategic relationship with the US and the West. This is bound to offset any advantage that Pakistan derives from similar efforts.
In the early 1940s, the Muslim League rejected the idea of the Indian sub-continent being governed by a constitution, which enshrined secular values. It pressed for partition of India and, under the leadership of Mr Mohammed Ali Jinnah, took the communal path and proclaimed that it was the sole representative of Muslims in the subcontinent. Muslims who supported the secular Congress Party were branded as Hindu chamchas [yes men] and traitors to Islam. By this logic, Pakistan claimed that Jammu and Kashmir being a Muslim majority state should be part of Pakistan. Thousands of armed Pakistani guerrillas crossed the border into the Kashmir valley. They were under the illusion that one Pakistani was equal to ten Indians. Their slogan was “Has kar liya Pakistan, lar kar lenge Hindustan”. The trucks in which they came were marked ‘Chalo Delhi’.
After a thorough beating, when the Indian Army was poised to clear the whole of Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan accepted a United Nations cease fire. This was to be followed by a withdrawal of Pakistani forces and a United Nations (UN)-supervised plebiscite to decide the will of the people. Pakistan was afraid to allow a plebiscite to be held as they knew that Shiekh Abdullah and his National Conference party would sweep the polls. Thus, Pakistan refused to withdraw and no plebiscite could be held. Pakistani propaganda kept repeating that India was refusing a plebiscite. However, Jinnah saw the reality and on his deathbed admitted to his doctor that the creation of Pakistan was the biggest disaster of his life.
The Indo-Pak Wars
Pakistan realized that its armed forces were too weak for them to force a military solution in Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan joined US-led anti-Soviet military pacts. In return, it received significant military supplies. By 1964, Pakistan's armed forces had a military edge over India in three vital areas: the air force, armour and artillery. This once again fired their illusions. Mr Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, persuaded President Ayub Khan to focus attention on Jammu and Kashmir as there was little risk of provoking a military show down. Indian Prime Minister Shastri warned Pakistan that any violations of the Cease Fire Line (CFL) would be treated as a violation of the international border and India would be compelled to take appropriate action to counter this.
Ignoring his warning, Pakistan launched an armoured division across the CFL, captured Chhamb, threatened Akhnur and the road communications from Jammu to Naushera and Poonch. On 6th September 1965, Shastri ordered the Armed Forces to counter this aggression and cross the international border if necessary. The Indo-Pak War of 1965 resulted in a military and political defeat for Pakistan. In the battles which ensued, Pakistan lost the cream of its armour in the Punjab. Pakistan's political aims had been countered. An emergency was declared in Pakistan. President Ayub Khan resigned. A UN imposed cease fire resulted in the re-establishment of a mutually agreed Cease Fire Line [CFL].
Pakistani propaganda claimed that India had wanted to overrun Pakistan and that their aggressive plans had been crushed. This illusion is perpetuated to this day, and 6th September is celebrated as "Save Pakistan Day". But Pakistani generals know the reality. They know that they cannot defeat India militarily. They have decided to "bleed" India by arming and training terrorists in occupied Jammu and Kashmir, and employing them for trans-border terror attacks. Pakistani propaganda claims these people to be freedom fighters. That explains the existence of terror infrastructure inside areas under Pakistani control.
Meanwhile, it had become apparent that there were strong cultural differences between East and West Pakistan, which could not be overcome by Islam. When the East Pakistani electorate, led by Mujibur Rehman, gained a lead over West Pakistan's Muslim League, the latter was not prepared to accept Mujibur Rehman as the Prime Minister. The President proclaimed martial law in East Pakistan, appointed Bhutto as Prime Minister, arrested Mujibur Rehman and began arresting and killing Bengali intellectuals and other prominent leaders.
Millions of Bengali refugees poured across the border into India where a provisional Bangladesh government in exile was established. Bengali guerrillas were recruited, organised, armed and trained. Soon the whole of East Pakistan was up in arms. Pakistani military positions were isolated and were faced with an impossible military task. Forces in West Pakistan, out of sheer desperation, launched futile air attacks across the western border against targets in India. In the ensuing Indo-Pak War of 1971, Pakistani armed forces in East Pakistan capitulated. 93,000 prisoners were evacuated to prison camps in India. East Pakistan was proclaimed as a sovereign state, Bangladesh. India declared a unilateral cease fire.
Bhutto released Mujibur Rehman and began negotiating for the repatriation of 93,000 prisoners of war. India demanded that the CFL be demarcated by a joint team. India wanted this to be treated as an international border, but Bhutto apparently pleaded that this decision be delayed until he had consolidated his position in Pakistan. India agreed and the prisoners were repatriated; the CFL was thereafter referred to as the Line of Control [LOC]. The Pakistani military was subdued after this defeat in Bangladesh but it was not prepared to allow Bhutto to consolidate his political power. Bhutto's opponents accused him of murdering a political rival. Bhutto was arrested, tried, found guilty and hanged. The military once again became the power behind the political throne in Islamabad.
Rise of SectarianismPartition had deeply affected the demographic balance of some areas of Pakistan. The majority of the migrants who went from India were Sunnis who were either serving in the armed forces or working as farm laborers. Many started working on the farms of Pakistani Shia landlords. Their poverty led to deep resentments and created an angry group deprived of resources and political representation.
Fearful of Shia activism following the 1978-79 Islamic revolution in Iran, General Zia Ul Haq inflamed Sunni fears and militarised Sunni militants. With the praiseworthy exception of Nawaz Sharif, all successive Pakistani governments have continued to manipulate sectarian tension for political purposes. With the assistance of Inter-Services Intelligence [ISI] successive governments also used sectarian elements to sustain Pakistan's interests in the conflicts in Jammu and Kashmir and Afghanistan. The Army has been accused of having encouraged sectarian conflict, which it can no longer control. Yet careful examination shows that the army has always been able to maintain sectarian violence at an acceptable level by fostering infighting between groups and even eliminating key leaders whenever an organisation or individual became too difficult to control.
Army’s Hold on Power
Historically the Army has been able to remain in full control of the country since 1947 in one form or the other. It has occasionally withdrawn behind the scenes whenever it could not fulfill the economic, social and political expectations of society or when the Army suffered a major military set back as happened in 1971 when East Pakistan broke away from Pakistan and became Bangladesh. But the Army never really gave up power. After every crisis the Army was able to control power while civilians had to bear the burden of governance.
The military regime formed an alliance with religious organisations and made them an integral part of the military system of dominance. Thus, the emergence of the Muttahid Majlis-e-Ammal MMA (a combination of several religious organisations) as a political force in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) did not impose any constraints on the government. On the contrary, the MMA split the votes of the other political parties and allowed Musharraf to pass the constitutional amendments necessary to transform the parliamentary system into a presidential one and institutionalise the political role of the army through creation of a National Security Council.
Although General Pervez Musharraf's role as a liberal moderniser is accepted by many, we should not exaggerate the dangers, which could arise by the possible assassination of the General. Notwithstanding the human tragedy of such a loss, his absence is unlikely to shift the power centre of the country. A suitable relief would be found by the military. The policies on Jammu and Kashmir and Afghanistan would continue and security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons would remain under army control.
Illusion of Democracy
The military knows that the illusion of formal democracy is an essential facade when it deals with the west. It, therefore, perpetuates a political party system and elections. The military continues to hold the reins of government while letting politicians deal with the difficulties of governance. Thus, free and fair elections and the formal transfer of power to a civilian head of state, though a necessary first step in the restoration of democracy, will by itself not result in the democratisation of the country. After they form a government, civilians will face an almost impossible task of balancing the priorities of civilian politics with the "demands" of the military. Lacking true autonomy, civilians will not be able to perform better than the military. At the same time, civil helplessness in the face of orchestrated sectarian violence will reinforce the army's role as the only institution able to physically control it. This is one of the main reasons why democratic politics have been repeatedly discredited in Pakistan.
Prominent Pakistani politicians have understood this. In May 2006, long time exiled rivals Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif got together in London and signed a "Charter to Democracy" for their country. This Charter envisages bringing the military under civilian control, disbanding the National Security Council, bringing the defence budget under parliamentary oversight and throwing out military officers who occupy civilian posts. An independent election commission would conduct polls and independence of the judiciary would be restored. This effort, if accompanied by sustained economic growth, will result in the emergence of a substantial middle class with a democratic character. It is this element that is likely to demand more participatory governance and evolve a democratic tradition. Significantly, the MMA has accepted reality and also declared its support for the Charter.
General Musharraf's position has been eroded considerably since his coup in October 1999. His propaganda machine is finding it difficult to project him as a knight out on a mission to rid Pakistan of corrupt politicians, or to rid the country of internal sectarian violence or to protect Pakistan from Indian aggression. Terrorists in Jammu and Kashmir can no longer pretend that they are freedom fighters and that their violence is directed at assisting the political aspirations of the people. Kashmiris have begun to see the reality of their situation. They have at last understood that Pakistan's game plan undermines their prosperity, without achieving any political gains. The West too has understood that the risk of an Islamist take over in Pakistan is a myth created by the military to consolidate its hold on power. Propaganda on all these connected issues no longer works.
The Army knows that it can no longer rely on full support from Sind, Baluchistan or the North Western Frontier Province (NWFP). It clings to the illusion that as long as Punjab continues to remain pro-army, and it can prevent the exiled politicians from establishing a working coalition, there is little that they can do to oust the army. To dispel this illusion, the opposition must sweep the polls and make the Charter work. Politicians have one big advantage. The common man has dispelled many old illusions. The army's propaganda machine no longer works.
Musharraf knows that this is a battle for the hearts and minds of the people. This is an internal struggle for power and Pakistani strategists will welcome an opportunity to somehow involve India. By supporting the opposition, India would be playing into the Army's hands. This would help the military to win public support on the grounds of national security against their arch rivals – devious Hindu infidels who want to break up Pakistan.
Erstwhile Pakistan Army Chief General Aslam Beg had publicly announced that any threat to Pakistan's security, no matter by whom, would evoke a nuclear strike against India. Could an internal political "threat" against military authoritarianism be treated as an Indian inspired threat? It is difficult to know what desperate power hungry generals will do when they sense that they are losing power. It is necessary that Indian Armed forces be prepared for any eventuality. At the same time it would be prudent to remind Pakistan that in the event of a nuclear threat, India has the power to wipe out Pakistan.
Pakistan Army's best bet would be to avoid a direct confrontation with India and continue sponsoring terrorist attacks. The aim is to provoke communal riots, create several mini-Pakistans within India and to prove to their people that secular governance doesn't work in India. India's response to this is to keep cool and improve its intelligence and security, and deal swiftly with those who plan and execute such attacks.
The Rising Baloch Insurgency
On 26 August 2006, Pakistan army launched a heliborne commando raid on a Baloch stronghold north-west of Quetta. The ensuing battle left Nawab Akbar Bugti, his guards and about 20 Pakistani soldiers dead. This incident has given a fresh lease of life to Balochistan's long simmering insurgency and put further strain on Pakistan's fragile nation state. It is clearly not in India's interest to get involved with Balochistan insurgency.
Indian Options
Under these circumstances, India should not only continue its "peace talks" with Pakistan but should prepare and plan for a post-Musharraf future and an inevitable structural change in Pakistan. Cynics will scoff at the talk of democracy in Pakistan. The question is not whether Pakistan will forever be under the thumb of the Army but whether India is preparing itself for inevitable changes in Pakistan.
Like all the other friends of Pakistan, India too must insist on an electoral process being 'free and fair'. These small steps could set the tone for a more assertive Indian policy towards Pakistan that will benefit the people of both countries
India is rightly taking pains to ensure that its empathy for the Baloch cause does not give an opportunity to Islamabad to either discredit the movement or divide opposition leaders by laying them open to the charge that they are toe-ing the Indian line.
While adopting a realistic approach towards Pakistan, India would do well to further develop strategic relationship with the US and the West. This is bound to offset any advantage that Pakistan derives from similar efforts.
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