MUSHARRAF’S RELEVANCE TO THE WEST

With the fair and free elections to Pakistan’s Parliament and four Provinces behind and the formation of a new democratic government already underway, the fate of a politically weakened Musharraf hinges crucially on the perception of the West about his relevance to its war on terror. Ever since 9/11, Musharraf has seemed to the West as their only hope in Pakistan and who has handed over hundreds of Al Qaeda terrorists to the US and positioned almost eight divisions (80,000 troops) on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border to stop Taleban’s trans border incursions. In return he has got billions in aid from the west for an economically weak Pakistan.

On the other hand, He provided safe havens to Al Qaeda and Taleban leadership in Quetta, concluded controversial deals with tribal extremists and allowed Islamists to propagate ideas of jihad and Sharia. His dual approach to towards terrorists-nabbing those inimical to the US and appeasing others-has, unfortunately, been justified by the West as a consequence of his trying to prove his indispensability in the war on terror. Such a short sited approach to the most serious threat facing the civilised world is bound to fire back at some later stage.

The West seems to have swallowed Musharraf’s plea that democracy in Pakistan must be tailored to local conditions – in short the democracy that keeps him in power rather than the global norm of democracy. In so doing, the West has ignored the fact that Musharraf has all along contributed to the Pakistani State promoting jihad through non-state terror apparatus, in Afghanistan and India. They still see his relevance in the worldwide matrix of Islamists challenging the West. The West has also winked at his failure to recalibrate the mullah-military alliance that cannot have entirely broken down after Operation Silence in Islamabad in Jul 2007. There is a strong argument for dismantling the unholy nexus as Pakistan now has a nuclear bomb on the shelf-not in the basement, the armed forces have been modernised and the economy is on the mend. Pakistan clearly does not need the mullahs anymore. Besides, they have become the main problem for Pakistan by their desperate attempts to derail the Indo-Pak peace process, dangerous efforts to provoke American retaliation and enforce their narrow self-serving brand of Sharia in Pakistan.

Under the circumstances, a pragmatic politico-military alliance needs to stem the growth of religious radicalism and reverse the trend started by a similar alliance in the 1980s. The West would do well to recall that Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) had supported the Operation Silence against Jaish e Mohammed terrorists hold up in Lal Masjid. The fact that PPP has emerged as the strongest contender for power and that the NWFP has rejected the mullahs in that Province should help the West to encourage a working relationship between the current military establishment and PPP.

That Musharraf joined the war on terror after being arm twisted by the US is well known; what should also be obvious to the US and the West is that his private deals with the tribal militants was responsible for strengthening the stranglehold of Islamic extremists leading to a phenomenal increase in terrorist activities in the region. It would be prudent to formulate a policy that does not alienate the population of Pakistan in order to prolong Musharraf’s stay in power.