Brief History of LTTE
On 5th May 1976, five young men including Velupillai Prabhakaran, Seelan, Mahattaya, Ragu and Umamaheswaran formed the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and were the first to be in the command structure of a five man council. Umamaheswaran was also chairman of the council while Prabhakaran was its military commander. When the original LTTE split and Umamaheswaran formed the Peoples Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) the majority of tigers went with Umamaheswaran. A dejected Prabhakaran teamed up with the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO) led by Thangathurai and Kuttimani for a while.
Prabakharan himself was In India for a long time. In his absence a triumvirate comprising Seelan, Mahattaya and Ragu ran the movement on ground. Prabakharan who was under house arrest in Madurai for the shoot-out with Umamaheswaran in Pondy Bazaar, escaped to Sri Lanka in 1983. Thereafter he asserted his leadership of the LTTE on ground.
The 1983 July anti-Tamil pogrom in Colombo saw the politico-military landscape change. Prabhakaran once again landed in Chennai (then Madras) and ran the LTTE from there. His cadres conducted guerrilla warfare in the North and East. There were different regional commanders but Ravindran alias Pandithar, a childhood friend of Prabhakaran was in overall charge of both provinces. Pandithar, based in Jaffna, was also both the military commander and political commissar for the district. He was the accredited LTTE “vice-captain”. Pandithar was killed in Atchuvely in January 1985. Thereafter Prabhakaran did not appoint an overall N-E commander. Instead he maintained contact with each individual regional commander. One reason for this was the LTTE leader’s caution. He did not want any single regional commander to become all powerful and pose a possible challenge to him in the future. Prabakharan returned to Sri Lanka in January 1987 and directed LTTE operations on ground.
In July 1987, Prabakharan nominated Gopalaswamy Mahendrarajah alias Mahattaya de-jure No 2 of the LTTE who was until then the Wanni regional commander. Prabakharan did so on the eve of his departure to India by air to meet Indian PM Rajiv Gandhi. The LTTE leader feared that something could happen to him in India. Therefore he wanted someone to run the LTTE if necessary.
Prabakharan also appointed Mahattaya as acting leader prior to his departure. He gave instructions that everyone should obey Mahattaya and that the acting leader could countermand any order sent by Prabakharan himself from India. This was because the LTTE leader suspected he may be detained by Indian authorities and could be forced to issue orders detrimental to the tigers. Prabakharan returned from India after the Indo-Lanka Accord was signed. He assumed leadership of the LTTE again but Mahattaya remained deputy - leader of the LTTE. Later Mahattaya was also made President of the LTTE’s political party called Peoples Front of Tamil Eelam (PFLT).
At one point serious differences emerged between Prabhakaran and Mahattaya. A “cold war” was on. The tiger leader asked his ex-Jaffna commander Sathasivampillai Krishnakumar alias Kittu to return home from abroad. Kittu however committed suicide on 16 Jan 1993 when the ship in which he was traveling got surrounded by the Indian navy in international waters. In December 1993 merchant vessel Yahata had left Phuket with a large consignment of weapons destined for Sri Lanka. 'Kittu' @ Krishnakumar Sathasivam, a close associate of LTTE supremo Vellupillai Prabhakaran, led the operation and when the Indian Navy intercepted the ship, Kittu blew it up and drowned along with several of his crew members.
Had Kittu returned safely he would have been appointed deputy-leader and accredited as successor to Prabhakaran. There was, however, further trouble in the LTTE. Pottu Amman, the LTTE intelligence chief, “uncovered” details of an alleged conspiracy involving Mahattaya who had already fallen out of favour with Prabakharan. Mahattaya was accused of conspiring with the Indian RAW (Research and Analysis wing) to kill Prabhakaran and take over the LTTE. After prolonged incarceration Mahattaya was executed on 28 Dec 1994 along with 257 LTTE cadres who were thought to be his strong loyalists.
The highest decision making body of the LTTE was a central committee comprising 32 persons. These included all regional commanders and heads of different divisions. But Prabakharan called the shots and though a certain amount of discussion was possible, there was no vote taking. Ultimately the central committee approved Prabhakaran’s diktat unanimously. The central committee was a virtual rubber stamp.
The most senior tiger in the hierarchy was a non descript “Baby” Subramaniam @ Ilankumaran, the head of the LTTE’s education division. Ilankumaran hailing from Kankesanthurai is a founder member of the LTTE in 1976. He remained steadfastly loyal to Prabakharan. Despite his seniority Ilankumaran is not a fighting man. Until 1991 he spent most of his days in India and coordinated all propaganda and political activity for the LTTE in Tamil Nadu. He cultivated a whole lot of Tamil Nadu politicians and promoted the tiger cause. It was he who established links with MG Ramachandran, the then Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu. Under present circumstances this Tamil Nadu connection would be perceived more as a liability than an asset by hardcore tiger elements. Also by nature and temperament the mild - mannered “Baby” is not likely to pursue power or hold on to it ruthlessly.
Prabakharan himself was In India for a long time. In his absence a triumvirate comprising Seelan, Mahattaya and Ragu ran the movement on ground. Prabakharan who was under house arrest in Madurai for the shoot-out with Umamaheswaran in Pondy Bazaar, escaped to Sri Lanka in 1983. Thereafter he asserted his leadership of the LTTE on ground.
The 1983 July anti-Tamil pogrom in Colombo saw the politico-military landscape change. Prabhakaran once again landed in Chennai (then Madras) and ran the LTTE from there. His cadres conducted guerrilla warfare in the North and East. There were different regional commanders but Ravindran alias Pandithar, a childhood friend of Prabhakaran was in overall charge of both provinces. Pandithar, based in Jaffna, was also both the military commander and political commissar for the district. He was the accredited LTTE “vice-captain”. Pandithar was killed in Atchuvely in January 1985. Thereafter Prabhakaran did not appoint an overall N-E commander. Instead he maintained contact with each individual regional commander. One reason for this was the LTTE leader’s caution. He did not want any single regional commander to become all powerful and pose a possible challenge to him in the future. Prabakharan returned to Sri Lanka in January 1987 and directed LTTE operations on ground.
In July 1987, Prabakharan nominated Gopalaswamy Mahendrarajah alias Mahattaya de-jure No 2 of the LTTE who was until then the Wanni regional commander. Prabakharan did so on the eve of his departure to India by air to meet Indian PM Rajiv Gandhi. The LTTE leader feared that something could happen to him in India. Therefore he wanted someone to run the LTTE if necessary.
Prabakharan also appointed Mahattaya as acting leader prior to his departure. He gave instructions that everyone should obey Mahattaya and that the acting leader could countermand any order sent by Prabakharan himself from India. This was because the LTTE leader suspected he may be detained by Indian authorities and could be forced to issue orders detrimental to the tigers. Prabakharan returned from India after the Indo-Lanka Accord was signed. He assumed leadership of the LTTE again but Mahattaya remained deputy - leader of the LTTE. Later Mahattaya was also made President of the LTTE’s political party called Peoples Front of Tamil Eelam (PFLT).
At one point serious differences emerged between Prabhakaran and Mahattaya. A “cold war” was on. The tiger leader asked his ex-Jaffna commander Sathasivampillai Krishnakumar alias Kittu to return home from abroad. Kittu however committed suicide on 16 Jan 1993 when the ship in which he was traveling got surrounded by the Indian navy in international waters. In December 1993 merchant vessel Yahata had left Phuket with a large consignment of weapons destined for Sri Lanka. 'Kittu' @ Krishnakumar Sathasivam, a close associate of LTTE supremo Vellupillai Prabhakaran, led the operation and when the Indian Navy intercepted the ship, Kittu blew it up and drowned along with several of his crew members.
Had Kittu returned safely he would have been appointed deputy-leader and accredited as successor to Prabhakaran. There was, however, further trouble in the LTTE. Pottu Amman, the LTTE intelligence chief, “uncovered” details of an alleged conspiracy involving Mahattaya who had already fallen out of favour with Prabakharan. Mahattaya was accused of conspiring with the Indian RAW (Research and Analysis wing) to kill Prabhakaran and take over the LTTE. After prolonged incarceration Mahattaya was executed on 28 Dec 1994 along with 257 LTTE cadres who were thought to be his strong loyalists.
The highest decision making body of the LTTE was a central committee comprising 32 persons. These included all regional commanders and heads of different divisions. But Prabakharan called the shots and though a certain amount of discussion was possible, there was no vote taking. Ultimately the central committee approved Prabhakaran’s diktat unanimously. The central committee was a virtual rubber stamp.
The most senior tiger in the hierarchy was a non descript “Baby” Subramaniam @ Ilankumaran, the head of the LTTE’s education division. Ilankumaran hailing from Kankesanthurai is a founder member of the LTTE in 1976. He remained steadfastly loyal to Prabakharan. Despite his seniority Ilankumaran is not a fighting man. Until 1991 he spent most of his days in India and coordinated all propaganda and political activity for the LTTE in Tamil Nadu. He cultivated a whole lot of Tamil Nadu politicians and promoted the tiger cause. It was he who established links with MG Ramachandran, the then Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu. Under present circumstances this Tamil Nadu connection would be perceived more as a liability than an asset by hardcore tiger elements. Also by nature and temperament the mild - mannered “Baby” is not likely to pursue power or hold on to it ruthlessly.
External Sources of Funds and Military Hardware
The LTTE used its international contacts to procure weapons, explosives, communications, and bomb making equipment. It exploited large Tamil communities in North America, Europe, and Asia to obtain funds and supplies for its fighters in Sri Lanka. It was involved in numerous trans national criminal activities, including partnerships with Pakistani heroin producers / traffickers, alien smuggling, extortion from Tamil families living abroad, and various forms of fraud.
In August 2006 following the European Union's (EU's) designation of the LTTE as a terrorist organization, Sweden, Finland, and Denmark announced their withdrawal from the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM).
The LTTE apparently procured much of its weapons from Cambodia, whose flourishing black market in arms is a legacy of the decades of civil war. In the early seventies, the United States supported the right-wing government in Phnom Penh, while China and North Vietnam supplied the resistance with munitions. China poured in even more weapons into Cambodia after the victory of the Maoist Khmer Rouge in 1975. Following the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in January 1979, China, Malaysia, Thailand and the West supported the anti-Vietnamese resistance led by the Khmer Rouge while the Soviet bloc supplied Phnom Penh with explosives, machine-guns, surface-to-air missiles, rockets, rocket launchers and AK-47 rifles. Finally, a peace treaty was signed in Paris in 1991.
The first LTTE operations in Phnom Penh were run out of Rani restaurant, whose upper storey was a virtual arsenal. Downstairs, a secretary handled professionally forged passports and visas. The LTTE's primary arms buyer, Selvarajah Pathmanathan, aka T.S. Kumaran, was first seen in Phnom Penh in mid-nineties. Both the Indian and Sri Lankan authorities constantly urged Phnom Penh to clamp down on LTTE activities, but to no avail. And security officials in Bangkok pointed out that more than 10,000 fishing trawlers roam the seas around Thailand, making it almost impossible to curb smuggling. Besides, Tamil presence in Phuket is much older than LTTE, which established a base near Trang on the Thai coast south of Phuket in the late eighties. The leader of that base was a Tamil skipper from Singapore, identified as Vijay Kumar. It was a communications centre, complete with radio equipment, warehouses, and access to shipping.
The LTTE presence in southeast Asia had grown and it has a network of private shipping companies, trading firms, hotels and restaurants in Thailand, Cambodia and Laos. After Kittu's death, most operations moved to Phuket and Ranong town on the mainland, where LTTE sympathisers teamed up with arms dealers of Thai and Burmese origin. Contacts were also established with Tamils on the bustling Silom Road in Bangkok.
In August 2006 following the European Union's (EU's) designation of the LTTE as a terrorist organization, Sweden, Finland, and Denmark announced their withdrawal from the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM).
The LTTE apparently procured much of its weapons from Cambodia, whose flourishing black market in arms is a legacy of the decades of civil war. In the early seventies, the United States supported the right-wing government in Phnom Penh, while China and North Vietnam supplied the resistance with munitions. China poured in even more weapons into Cambodia after the victory of the Maoist Khmer Rouge in 1975. Following the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in January 1979, China, Malaysia, Thailand and the West supported the anti-Vietnamese resistance led by the Khmer Rouge while the Soviet bloc supplied Phnom Penh with explosives, machine-guns, surface-to-air missiles, rockets, rocket launchers and AK-47 rifles. Finally, a peace treaty was signed in Paris in 1991.
The first LTTE operations in Phnom Penh were run out of Rani restaurant, whose upper storey was a virtual arsenal. Downstairs, a secretary handled professionally forged passports and visas. The LTTE's primary arms buyer, Selvarajah Pathmanathan, aka T.S. Kumaran, was first seen in Phnom Penh in mid-nineties. Both the Indian and Sri Lankan authorities constantly urged Phnom Penh to clamp down on LTTE activities, but to no avail. And security officials in Bangkok pointed out that more than 10,000 fishing trawlers roam the seas around Thailand, making it almost impossible to curb smuggling. Besides, Tamil presence in Phuket is much older than LTTE, which established a base near Trang on the Thai coast south of Phuket in the late eighties. The leader of that base was a Tamil skipper from Singapore, identified as Vijay Kumar. It was a communications centre, complete with radio equipment, warehouses, and access to shipping.
The LTTE presence in southeast Asia had grown and it has a network of private shipping companies, trading firms, hotels and restaurants in Thailand, Cambodia and Laos. After Kittu's death, most operations moved to Phuket and Ranong town on the mainland, where LTTE sympathisers teamed up with arms dealers of Thai and Burmese origin. Contacts were also established with Tamils on the bustling Silom Road in Bangkok.
LTTE Front Organisations
Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO). The TRO which has its headquarters in Melbourne, Australia. Money collected ostensibly for post–tsunami relief and reconstruction projects in the North were actually used for financing LTTE weapons procurement programmes.
Tamil Coordination Committee (TCC). Active in Europe. At least 30 front and cover organisations in the UK, including the Tamil Center for Human Rights (TCHR), Human Rights for Tamils (HURT), Melrose Publishers, Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO), Tamil Eelam Economic Development Organisation (TEEDOR) were used by the LTTE for its funds collection and coordination of weapons procurement.
People Against Sri Lankan Oppression (PASLO), Gauteng, which has branches throughout South Africa; the Movement Against Sri Lankan Oppression (MASLO), Cape Town and Durban; the Dravidians for Peace and Justice (DPJ), Gauteng, an offshoot of the PASLO; the Tamil Eelam Support Movement (TESM), Durban; the Peace for Sri Lanka Support Movement (PSLSM), Pretoria, an alliance of several groups.
The PSLSM, the latest front organisation to be established by the LTTE, was set up in March-April 1998. In an effort to wield greater influence, the LTTE also attempted to infiltrate other Tamil organisations in South Africa such as the Natal Tamil Federation, the South African Tamil Federation, the Tamil Federation of Gauteng and the World Saiva Council of Chatsworth.
World Tamil Movement (WTM). Now banned in Canada as a terrorist organisation.
U.S.-based Tamil Foundation. The head of the Tamil Foundation is also president of the Tamils Rehabilitation Organization (TRO) in the United States.
LTTE Communication Centre in Norway is the most important for the rebel organization who daily send information from the jungles of the Wanni to Oslo the bustling capital of Norway, from which point, within a period of less than twenty four hours, it is put on the internet and distributed globally.
Tamil Youth Organization (TYO). Active in Australia, Canada, Denmark, France Germany, Holland, Italy, Malaysia, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and USA.
Tamil Coordination Committee (TCC). Active in Europe. At least 30 front and cover organisations in the UK, including the Tamil Center for Human Rights (TCHR), Human Rights for Tamils (HURT), Melrose Publishers, Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO), Tamil Eelam Economic Development Organisation (TEEDOR) were used by the LTTE for its funds collection and coordination of weapons procurement.
People Against Sri Lankan Oppression (PASLO), Gauteng, which has branches throughout South Africa; the Movement Against Sri Lankan Oppression (MASLO), Cape Town and Durban; the Dravidians for Peace and Justice (DPJ), Gauteng, an offshoot of the PASLO; the Tamil Eelam Support Movement (TESM), Durban; the Peace for Sri Lanka Support Movement (PSLSM), Pretoria, an alliance of several groups.
The PSLSM, the latest front organisation to be established by the LTTE, was set up in March-April 1998. In an effort to wield greater influence, the LTTE also attempted to infiltrate other Tamil organisations in South Africa such as the Natal Tamil Federation, the South African Tamil Federation, the Tamil Federation of Gauteng and the World Saiva Council of Chatsworth.
World Tamil Movement (WTM). Now banned in Canada as a terrorist organisation.
U.S.-based Tamil Foundation. The head of the Tamil Foundation is also president of the Tamils Rehabilitation Organization (TRO) in the United States.
LTTE Communication Centre in Norway is the most important for the rebel organization who daily send information from the jungles of the Wanni to Oslo the bustling capital of Norway, from which point, within a period of less than twenty four hours, it is put on the internet and distributed globally.
Tamil Youth Organization (TYO). Active in Australia, Canada, Denmark, France Germany, Holland, Italy, Malaysia, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and USA.
The Indian Involvement
India had provided support to Tamil interests from the very conception of the secessionist movement. This was both as a result of a large Tamil community in South India, as well as India's Regional security interests which attempted to reduce the scope of foreign intervention, especially those linked to the United States, Pakistan, and China. To this end, India sought to make it clear to the Sri Lankan President, Jayewardene that armed intervention in support of the Tamil movement was an option India would consider if any diplomatic solutions should fail. Following the anti- Tamil riots of 1983, the Tamil rebel movement grew progressively strong and increasingly violent. LTTE emerged as the strongest of militant groups in Sri Lanka.
Operation Liberation
1985 saw the Sri-Lankan Government rearming itself extensively for its anti-insurgent role with support from Pakistan, Israel, Singapore and South Africa. In 1987, retaliating an increasingly bloody insurgent movement, Operation Liberation was launched by the Sri Lankan security forces against LTTE strongholds in Jaffna Peninsula, involving nearly four thousand troops, supported by helicopter gunships as well as Ground attack aircraft. In June 1987, the Sri Lankan Army laid siege on the town of Jaffna. As civilian casualties grew, India, which had a substantial Tamil population in South India, called on the Sri Lankan government to halt the offensive in an attempt to negotiate a political settlement.
Operation Poomalai
Failing to negotiate an end to the crisis with Sri Lanka, India announced on 2 June 1987 that it would send a convoy of unarmed ships to northern Sri Lanka to provide humanitarian assistance but this was intercepted by the Sri Lankan Navy and turned back.
Indian government mounted an airdrop of relief supplies over the besieged city of Jaffna. On 4 June 1987, the Indian Air Force mounted Operation Poomalai in broad daylight. Five An-32s of the Indian Air Force escorted by heavily armed Indian fighter jets flew over Jaffna to airdrop 25 tons of supplies, all the time keeping well within the range of Sri Lankan radar coverage. At the same time the Sri Lankan Ambassador to New Delhi was summoned to the Foreign Office to be informed by the Minister External Affairs, K Natwar Singh, of the ongoing operation. It was also made clear to the Ambassador that if the operation was in any way hindered by Sri Lanka, India would launch a full-force military retaliation against Sri Lanka. The ultimate aim of the operation was both to demonstrate the credibility of the Indian option of active intervention to the Sri Lankan Government, as an act of support for the Sri Lankan Tamils.
Faced with the possibility of an active Indian intervention, the Sri Lankan President, JR Jayewardene, offered to hold talks with the Rajiv Gandhi government on future moves. The siege of Jaffna was soon lifted, followed by a round of negotiations that led to the signing of the Indo-Sri-Lankan accord on 29 July 1987 that brought a temporary truce.
Operation Liberation
1985 saw the Sri-Lankan Government rearming itself extensively for its anti-insurgent role with support from Pakistan, Israel, Singapore and South Africa. In 1987, retaliating an increasingly bloody insurgent movement, Operation Liberation was launched by the Sri Lankan security forces against LTTE strongholds in Jaffna Peninsula, involving nearly four thousand troops, supported by helicopter gunships as well as Ground attack aircraft. In June 1987, the Sri Lankan Army laid siege on the town of Jaffna. As civilian casualties grew, India, which had a substantial Tamil population in South India, called on the Sri Lankan government to halt the offensive in an attempt to negotiate a political settlement.
Operation Poomalai
Failing to negotiate an end to the crisis with Sri Lanka, India announced on 2 June 1987 that it would send a convoy of unarmed ships to northern Sri Lanka to provide humanitarian assistance but this was intercepted by the Sri Lankan Navy and turned back.
Indian government mounted an airdrop of relief supplies over the besieged city of Jaffna. On 4 June 1987, the Indian Air Force mounted Operation Poomalai in broad daylight. Five An-32s of the Indian Air Force escorted by heavily armed Indian fighter jets flew over Jaffna to airdrop 25 tons of supplies, all the time keeping well within the range of Sri Lankan radar coverage. At the same time the Sri Lankan Ambassador to New Delhi was summoned to the Foreign Office to be informed by the Minister External Affairs, K Natwar Singh, of the ongoing operation. It was also made clear to the Ambassador that if the operation was in any way hindered by Sri Lanka, India would launch a full-force military retaliation against Sri Lanka. The ultimate aim of the operation was both to demonstrate the credibility of the Indian option of active intervention to the Sri Lankan Government, as an act of support for the Sri Lankan Tamils.
Faced with the possibility of an active Indian intervention, the Sri Lankan President, JR Jayewardene, offered to hold talks with the Rajiv Gandhi government on future moves. The siege of Jaffna was soon lifted, followed by a round of negotiations that led to the signing of the Indo-Sri-Lankan accord on 29 July 1987 that brought a temporary truce.
The Indo Sri Lanka Accord 1987
The Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord was signed in Colombo on 29 July 1987, between Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Sri Lankan President J.R. Jayewardene. Under the terms of the agreement, Colombo agreed to a devolution of power to the North and East provinces, the Sri Lankan troops were withdrawnto their barracks in the north, and the Tamil rebels were to disarm. The provisions of the Indo-Sri Lanka accord of 1987 also envisioned a referendum to decide if the Eastern and Northern provinces should remain separate or united
The Tamil groups, notably the LTTE had not been made party to the talks and initially agreed to surrender their arms to the IPKF only reluctantly. Within a few months however, this flared into an active confrontation. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) declared their intent to continue the armed struggle for an independent Tamil Eelam and refused to disarm. The Indian Peace-Keeping Force found itself engaged in a bloody action against the LTTE.
Yet another provision of the Indo-Sri Lanka accord stipulated that certain areas were to be recognized as Tamil majority areas, before any electoral democratic process got under way. This could have ensured that the election will occur in a neutral political environment and ensure a free and fair process that met international standards.
One of the key weaknesses of the Indo-Sri Lanka accord was that it lacked a common core of constitutional principles that would form the basis of a political settlement. Rather, it merely recognized that Sri-Lanka was "a multi-ethnic and multi-lingual plural society", which is merely a principle of political nationhood but not a statement of constitutional principles.
The Current Situation in North East Sri Lanka
The Tamil groups, notably the LTTE had not been made party to the talks and initially agreed to surrender their arms to the IPKF only reluctantly. Within a few months however, this flared into an active confrontation. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) declared their intent to continue the armed struggle for an independent Tamil Eelam and refused to disarm. The Indian Peace-Keeping Force found itself engaged in a bloody action against the LTTE.
Yet another provision of the Indo-Sri Lanka accord stipulated that certain areas were to be recognized as Tamil majority areas, before any electoral democratic process got under way. This could have ensured that the election will occur in a neutral political environment and ensure a free and fair process that met international standards.
One of the key weaknesses of the Indo-Sri Lanka accord was that it lacked a common core of constitutional principles that would form the basis of a political settlement. Rather, it merely recognized that Sri-Lanka was "a multi-ethnic and multi-lingual plural society", which is merely a principle of political nationhood but not a statement of constitutional principles.
The Current Situation in North East Sri Lanka
The LTTE has been militarily decimated with most top level leaders including the dictatorial chief, Velupillai Prabhakaran, killed. With the leadership vacuum in the LTTE, lower cadres in a state of disarray and the civilian Tamil population disillusioned with LTTE’s uncompromising stance for gaining a better political deal for the Tamils, the future of the hapless Tamil population is fraught with unimaginable hardships. Unless the International community, and India in particular, intervenes on their behalf to create the right pressure points upon a victorious and jubilant Sri Lankan government, the misery of war affected Tamils can only be compounded. Ironically, the LTTE, which waged a war ostensibly to protect the Tamils, has left them more vulnerable than ever before. While Prabhakaran and the LTTE strengthened the bargaining position of Tamils, they were simultaneously the biggest obstacle in the path of a negotiated settlement to the conflict.
With Prabhakaran's exit, Tamil obstruction to a negotiated settlement has been removed. When Rajapaksa opens negotiations with the Tamils, the latter will be in a weak position, weakened not only by the absence of the LTTE but also undermined by it. The LTTE systematically decimated a generation of Tamil moderate leaders and intellectuals. The input of people like Neelan Tiruchelvam and Ketesh Loganathan, intellectuals who were assassinated by the LTTE for daring to differ with its methods, will be sorely missed.
With Prabhakaran's exit, Tamil obstruction to a negotiated settlement has been removed. When Rajapaksa opens negotiations with the Tamils, the latter will be in a weak position, weakened not only by the absence of the LTTE but also undermined by it. The LTTE systematically decimated a generation of Tamil moderate leaders and intellectuals. The input of people like Neelan Tiruchelvam and Ketesh Loganathan, intellectuals who were assassinated by the LTTE for daring to differ with its methods, will be sorely missed.
Factors Responsible for LTTE’s Defeat
1. hostile international environment that all non-state actors engaging in armed struggle encountered after the terror attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001.
2. Tagged with the terrorist label by several countries, the LTTE's global fundraising, its front organizations and the logistical network came under immense pressure.
3. "Colonel Karuna", joining hands with the government in the military operations against the LTTE.
4. in 2005 Rajapaksa became president. A hardliner, his orders to the armed forces were unambiguous: they were to fight the LTTE not to merely weaken it but to defeat it, to "finish it off" once and for all.
5. The seeds of the LTTE's destruction lay in the organization itself, in fateful decisions that by its leadership that set it on course towards oblivion.
(a) Its decision to assassinate former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in Tamil Nadu 1991 was perhaps its biggest blunder. It not only earned the LTTE the terrorist label from India, but also made India a permanent enemy. Its support base in Tamil Nadu was eroded and its logistical network dismantled. And worse, it resulted in a robust military cooperation and other links between India and Sri Lanka.
(b) Misreading of the potential of the 2002 ceasefire and the talks that followed. Instead of seeing this as a chance to reach a settlement of the conflict, the LTTE saw it as an opportunity to rearm and regroup. It walked out of the talks and did everything possible to make the peace process fail. The war that followed was disastrous for the Tigers.
(c) It gravely miscalculated when it called on Tamils to boycott the 2005 presidential poll. The impact of that boycott saw Mahinda Rajapaksa win by a wafer-thin majority. Perhaps it thought that Rajapaksa as president would result in rallying Tamil support around the Tigers. It did not foresee that Rajapaksa would prove to be their nemesis.
(d) The LTTE appears to have believed its own propaganda. It believed it was militarily invincible. Its closing of the sluice gates of Mavil Aru in July 2006, inviting the vastly stronger armed forces to launch an offensive and at a time when international sentiment was not in its favor, can only be described as suicidal.
(e) The LTTE's use of suicide bombings, its intolerance of dissent, the recruitment of children and its utter disregard for human lives severely undermined support from foreign governments. It is proscribed in 32 counties
(f) The LTTE overestimated itself, even when its military capabilities were waning. In its desperation to hold onto territory and perceiving itself as a conventional army, it fought a defensive war when it lacked the numbers and the firepower for such a strategy. In the circumstances, defeat was inevitable. The LTTE defeated itself.
(g) Prabhakaran was uncompromising in his commitment to the creation of an independent Tamil Eelam. Perhaps too uncompromising for the good of the LTTE or the Tamil people whose interests he claimed to protect.
(h) There were political solutions, like the India-Sri Lanka Accord of 1987 that provided the Tamils with a measure of autonomy. But such solutions Prabhakaran rejected as inadequate as they provided for "less than Tamil Eelam".
(i) Prabhakaran preferred returning to the battlefield time and again, uncaring of the large number of Tamils who were getting killed in the bloody wars. Over 70,000 people are said to have died in the 25-year-long insurgency. This might have been avoided had Prabhakaran been realistic and seriously explored a political solution.
(j) Perhaps the most important reason for the defeat of the tigers was the enforced "one family, one fighter" policy, forcing each family to provide at least one recruit to the LTTE. As 2008 progressed and the LTTE's military position deteriorated, it resorted to more aggressive recruitment, including of older teenagers. The LTTE required individuals to purchase the right to leave LTTE-controlled territory. It also used civilians as human shields. This effectively alienated the Tamils who had already paid a heavy price for LTTE’s intransigence in negotiating a truce.
2. Tagged with the terrorist label by several countries, the LTTE's global fundraising, its front organizations and the logistical network came under immense pressure.
3. "Colonel Karuna", joining hands with the government in the military operations against the LTTE.
4. in 2005 Rajapaksa became president. A hardliner, his orders to the armed forces were unambiguous: they were to fight the LTTE not to merely weaken it but to defeat it, to "finish it off" once and for all.
5. The seeds of the LTTE's destruction lay in the organization itself, in fateful decisions that by its leadership that set it on course towards oblivion.
(a) Its decision to assassinate former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in Tamil Nadu 1991 was perhaps its biggest blunder. It not only earned the LTTE the terrorist label from India, but also made India a permanent enemy. Its support base in Tamil Nadu was eroded and its logistical network dismantled. And worse, it resulted in a robust military cooperation and other links between India and Sri Lanka.
(b) Misreading of the potential of the 2002 ceasefire and the talks that followed. Instead of seeing this as a chance to reach a settlement of the conflict, the LTTE saw it as an opportunity to rearm and regroup. It walked out of the talks and did everything possible to make the peace process fail. The war that followed was disastrous for the Tigers.
(c) It gravely miscalculated when it called on Tamils to boycott the 2005 presidential poll. The impact of that boycott saw Mahinda Rajapaksa win by a wafer-thin majority. Perhaps it thought that Rajapaksa as president would result in rallying Tamil support around the Tigers. It did not foresee that Rajapaksa would prove to be their nemesis.
(d) The LTTE appears to have believed its own propaganda. It believed it was militarily invincible. Its closing of the sluice gates of Mavil Aru in July 2006, inviting the vastly stronger armed forces to launch an offensive and at a time when international sentiment was not in its favor, can only be described as suicidal.
(e) The LTTE's use of suicide bombings, its intolerance of dissent, the recruitment of children and its utter disregard for human lives severely undermined support from foreign governments. It is proscribed in 32 counties
(f) The LTTE overestimated itself, even when its military capabilities were waning. In its desperation to hold onto territory and perceiving itself as a conventional army, it fought a defensive war when it lacked the numbers and the firepower for such a strategy. In the circumstances, defeat was inevitable. The LTTE defeated itself.
(g) Prabhakaran was uncompromising in his commitment to the creation of an independent Tamil Eelam. Perhaps too uncompromising for the good of the LTTE or the Tamil people whose interests he claimed to protect.
(h) There were political solutions, like the India-Sri Lanka Accord of 1987 that provided the Tamils with a measure of autonomy. But such solutions Prabhakaran rejected as inadequate as they provided for "less than Tamil Eelam".
(i) Prabhakaran preferred returning to the battlefield time and again, uncaring of the large number of Tamils who were getting killed in the bloody wars. Over 70,000 people are said to have died in the 25-year-long insurgency. This might have been avoided had Prabhakaran been realistic and seriously explored a political solution.
(j) Perhaps the most important reason for the defeat of the tigers was the enforced "one family, one fighter" policy, forcing each family to provide at least one recruit to the LTTE. As 2008 progressed and the LTTE's military position deteriorated, it resorted to more aggressive recruitment, including of older teenagers. The LTTE required individuals to purchase the right to leave LTTE-controlled territory. It also used civilians as human shields. This effectively alienated the Tamils who had already paid a heavy price for LTTE’s intransigence in negotiating a truce.
Future of LTTE
With the demise of Appiah Annai and the semi-retirement of Thevar Annai and Basheer Kakka the only other senior from the pre-July 1983 days who is active in the LTTE in the Wanni is the dreaded Intelligence chief Pottu Amman. Pottu joined the LTTE in 1982. He was a “helper” long before that. All the other senior tiger commanders like Soosai, Bhanu, Sornam, Jeyam, Theepan, Balraj, Nadesan etc joined the LTTE after July 1983. Apart from Pottu’s seniority there is also another factor that makes him a serious contender for the crown. The only man who could have effectively challenged Pottu Amman for leadership was former Batticaloa-Amparai commander Vinayagamoorthy Muraleetharan alias Karuna Amman. Both of them were blue-eyed boys of the big boss and there was simmering tension between them. But Pottu emerged victor in the battle of the Ammans. Karuna was ejected as “thurogi” or traitor. In such a situation the succession stakes seem a virtual one - horse race. It would be difficult for Pottu Amman or any would be successor to “fill” Prabakharan’s shoes automatically. There has to be an interim period before such an eventuality. Two options are possible. One is for a leadership committee chaired by Ilankumaran to run affairs for some time. The other is for a cabal of senior tiger leaders to provide an informal collective leadership. Prabakharan’s wife Mathivathany was seen increasingly in public before the final phase of military operations against the LTTE. Her “influence” was visible in the overseas branches of the LTTE. Plum positions in the LTTE overseas branches and institutions had been given to her relatives. Their passport to success was Ms. Mathivathany Prabakharan.
Diaspora Reaction
The Diaspora which has invested much in the Eelam illusion [of a separate state for the minority Tamils in Sri Lanka] is distraught. It initially refused to believe the death of Velupillai Prabhakaran. It had contributed to the conflict and is equally responsible for present plight of the Tamils. It ignored the fact that other people's children were recruited to die in mosquito-infested jungles while the diaspora wrote out checks every month to salvage its conscience and placate the ghosts of 1983 [the year of ethnic riots in Sri Lanka]. Those who 'donated' funds out of a compulsion arising out of their kin being left alone back home by the LTTE will not be grieving for an end to the menace. Those who had been duped by the LTTE of the sincerity of their objectives are most likely to come to terms with ground reality with time.
As to the Indian politicians like Vaiko, P Nedumaran and others from Tamil Nadu who were LTTE stooges, they have been shown their correct place by the people of the State in the recently concluded Parliamentary elections. While the people of Tamil Nadu have always supported the Sri Lankan Tamils in pursuit of their legitimate political aspirations, they have proved that such support does not extend to a terrorist organisation that was responsible for the brutal assassination of their Prime Minister.
Furure of the Conflict
The LTTE no longer exists as a military organization and its military assets and capabilities have been destroyed. The LTTE is defeated, not dead. Several Tigers are bound to have escaped the armed forces and they will be thirsting for revenge. The war is over; but the ethnic conflict is not over yet. The grievances of the Tamils, and their alienation and anger that gave rise to militancy and organizations like the LTTE in the first place, remain unresolved. The issues that kept the insurgency alive for three decades are very much alive.
To imagine that elimination of Prabakharan and defeat of the LTTE would automatically result in the extinguishing of the ethnic problem would be a colossal blunder. Prabakharan and the LTTE did not create the Tamil problem. Sinhala chauvinist politicians created the problem. Prabakharan and the LTTE were by - products of the problem created through majoritarian hegemony.
Prabakharan was only two years old when Sinhala was declared as the sole official language of Sri Lanka. He was four years old when the 1958 anti - Tamil violence was unleashed. The LTTE leader was only seven years old when the non - violent Satyagraha of the Tamil Federal Party was brutally suppressed by deploying the army and detaining Gandhiyan leaders without trial. The rise of organizations like the Jathiya Hela Urumaya (JHU) show that the problem will not go away now that the LTTE is not there. The JHU advocates an ideology of a Sinhala Nationalist stance in its politics and advocates wiping out the Tamil tigers by force. It wants to maintain Sri Lanka's unitary constitution with meager devolution of powers to Tamils as a solution to the present conflict.
The Tamil National question can be solved only on the basis of justice and equality. Grievances of the Tamils have to be redressed and their legitimate aspirations addressed. As long as the Tamil problem remains unsolved, virulent expressions of Tamil ultra- nationalism like Prabakharan and the LTTE will continue to manifest in different forms.
To imagine that elimination of Prabakharan and defeat of the LTTE would automatically result in the extinguishing of the ethnic problem would be a colossal blunder. Prabakharan and the LTTE did not create the Tamil problem. Sinhala chauvinist politicians created the problem. Prabakharan and the LTTE were by - products of the problem created through majoritarian hegemony.
Prabakharan was only two years old when Sinhala was declared as the sole official language of Sri Lanka. He was four years old when the 1958 anti - Tamil violence was unleashed. The LTTE leader was only seven years old when the non - violent Satyagraha of the Tamil Federal Party was brutally suppressed by deploying the army and detaining Gandhiyan leaders without trial. The rise of organizations like the Jathiya Hela Urumaya (JHU) show that the problem will not go away now that the LTTE is not there. The JHU advocates an ideology of a Sinhala Nationalist stance in its politics and advocates wiping out the Tamil tigers by force. It wants to maintain Sri Lanka's unitary constitution with meager devolution of powers to Tamils as a solution to the present conflict.
The Tamil National question can be solved only on the basis of justice and equality. Grievances of the Tamils have to be redressed and their legitimate aspirations addressed. As long as the Tamil problem remains unsolved, virulent expressions of Tamil ultra- nationalism like Prabakharan and the LTTE will continue to manifest in different forms.
The only guarantee to ensure that all this happens is to have the United Nations or a multi-national conference assist Sri Lanka in the capacity of an honest third party. There is an urgent need for a sound constitutional process, which is based on the principles of strong federalism, respect for the territorial integrity of Sri Lanka and guaranteed protection of minority rights. Particularly at issue would be the status of minority rights to language, education, and religion, devolution of power, local control of law and order and budgetary autonomy. All of those sensitive issues lie at the core of legitimate Tamil demands for equality and equal treatment.
In addition, human rights abuses have been committed by both sides in the recent war, but the Sri Lankan government bears a special responsibility to face up to its accountability, both because a state always bears more responsibility for its conduct under international law and because it is after all the victor.
The Tamil community also needs to acknowledge a responsibility to reckon with the abuses of the LTTE, which was charged with the violation of grave violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, for example, by using civilians as human shields, and by drafting children as soldiers and suicide bombers.
Finally, reconstructing the war-shattered parts of Sri Lanka is going to be a crucial but a difficult process. The Tamil people need to see concrete improvement in their livelihood and economic security swiftly, in order to begin to trust the Sri Lankan government's intentions. That must be done without altering the ethnic balance on the ground and without exacerbating landlessness, which is already one of the main sources of tension.
In addition, human rights abuses have been committed by both sides in the recent war, but the Sri Lankan government bears a special responsibility to face up to its accountability, both because a state always bears more responsibility for its conduct under international law and because it is after all the victor.
The Tamil community also needs to acknowledge a responsibility to reckon with the abuses of the LTTE, which was charged with the violation of grave violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, for example, by using civilians as human shields, and by drafting children as soldiers and suicide bombers.
Finally, reconstructing the war-shattered parts of Sri Lanka is going to be a crucial but a difficult process. The Tamil people need to see concrete improvement in their livelihood and economic security swiftly, in order to begin to trust the Sri Lankan government's intentions. That must be done without altering the ethnic balance on the ground and without exacerbating landlessness, which is already one of the main sources of tension.
Conclusion
To imagine that the elimination of Prabakharan and extinction of the LTTE would autmotically result in the extinguishing of the ethnic problem in Sri Lanka is a colossal blunder. Prabakharan and the LTTE did not create the Tamil problem. Sinhala chauvinist politicians created the problem. Prabakharan and the LTTE were by - products of the problem created through majoritarian hegemony. Prabakharan was only two years old when Sinhala was enthroned as the sole official language. He was four years old when the 1958 anti - Tamil violence was unleashed. The LTTE leader was only seven years old when the non - violent Satyagraha of the Federal Party was brutally suppressed by deploying the army and detaining Gandhiyan Tamil leaders without a trial. The rise of organizations like the Hela Urumaya show that the problem will not go away now that the LTTE has been decimated.
A durable solution to the Tamil National question can be evolved only on the basis of justice and equality. Grievances and legitimate aspirations of the Tamils have to be redressed and addressed. As long as the Tamil problem remains unsolved, virulent expressions of Tamil ultra- nationalism like Prabakharan and the LTTE will continue to manifest in different forms.
A durable solution to the Tamil National question can be evolved only on the basis of justice and equality. Grievances and legitimate aspirations of the Tamils have to be redressed and addressed. As long as the Tamil problem remains unsolved, virulent expressions of Tamil ultra- nationalism like Prabakharan and the LTTE will continue to manifest in different forms.
No comments:
Post a Comment