Background
Traditional regions that favor harvesting terror crops in Pakistan include the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in the North West part of the country comprising of seven autonomous agencies Bajaur, Khyber, Kurram, Mohmand, Orakzai, South Waziristan, North Waziristan, and the tribal adjoining the Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu and Dera IsmailkhanDistricts of North Western Frontier Province (NWFP). These agencies are predominantly populated by Pashtun tribes, with the 2500 Km long Durand line, created by the British in 1893, between Pakistan and Afghanistan border dividing tribes on the two sides. The region is now controlled by a new and local version of Taliban.
The original Taliban, mainly comprising of Pashtun students from Afghanistan, were organized, trained and equipped by Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) for a jihad in Afghanistan. Hundreds of ISI officers were deployed with the Taliban in different parts of Afghanistan. Post 9//11, General Musharraf chose to side with the United States (US) against a Taliban- Al Qaeda combine in return for a more than generous economic and military aid. As a partner in USA’s “war on Terror", Musharraf took the following steps:-
· Handed over two tactical air bases in Baluchistan to the US for their operations in Afghanistan.
· Deployed 80,000 troops in FATA to assist NATO’s operations in Afghanistan.
· Pulled out the ISI operatives from Afghanistan who were coordinating operations of Taliban in that country.
· Allowed the CIA to open stations within Pakistan.
Western Awareness
Discreetly, he also evacuated hundreds of Taliban to FATA, where they found a sanctuary. Half hearted campaign to eliminate terrorists from FATA only resulted in the Pakistani forces suffering heavy casualties. Musharraf, there after, adopted a policy of appeasement of the FATA based terrorists, signing peace accords, first in South Waziristan in April 2004 and then in North Waziristan in Sep 2006. The accords convinced the West that Pakistan was not doing anything to comply with a UN resolution that designates Taliban as terrorists. The US too, for the first time, declared Pakistan as the centre of Al Qaeda network. In his testimony before the Senate Intelligence Community on 11 Jan 2007, the Director of National Intelligence, John Negroponte, warned of the continuing threat posed by Al Qaeda and Taliban operating from Pakistan. The US Secretary for Defence, Robert Gates, while on a visit to Afghanistan on 15 Jan 2007, said that terrorists were operating from across the border.
The confirmation of this came from captured Taliban spokesman, Abdul Haq Haqiq @ Dr Mohemmed Hanif who stated that the Taliban’s Mullah Mohammed Omar was hiding in Pakistan under the protection of ISI. He also confirmed that suicide bombers were being trained in madrassas in Bajaur district of FATA and that regular suicide bombings in Afghanistan were carried out by Taliban , financed, trained and equipped by the ISI. By now, there was no doubt left that
Pakistan was at the centre of the web of terror that had tentacles throughout the world. Western diplomats in Afghanistan and Pakistan as well as Pakistani opposition leaders also confirmed that the ISI and Military Intelligence were actively supporting the Taliban resurgence, motivated by a long held view that Taliban dominance in Afghanistan would provide Pakistan with greater strategic depth on its western frontiers.
The attack on Ms Carlotta Gall, the New York Times correspondent, in her hotel room in Quetta is of interest. She emphatically stated that Taliban and Al Qaeda had entrenched themselves in the mountainous tribal areas of Pakistan and from there they were recruiting and training a new generation of fighters and suicide bombers to attack NATO forces in Afghanistan. The attack was allegedly carried out by Pakistani agents who also seized her computer.
Terror As An Instrument of State Policy
In the 1980s, Pakistan’s Afghan policy was conducted with the help of the Jammat-e-Islami (JEI), the main rival of the JUI in Pakistan and the Afghan Hizb-e Islami (HEI) led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. For over a decade the ISI’s connection with the JEI and the HEI remained the Government’s main instrument of policy that ensured continuous flow of arms and aid from the US and Arab countries to the Ghilzai Pashtun war lords of Central and North Eastern Afghanistan. In contrast, the Durrani Pashtuns, who dominate the South and Kandahar, were largely ignored by the ISI. The JUI cunningly exploited this step motherly treatment of the Durrani Pashtuns and built up a support base among them in Baluchistan and the NWFP. In 1993, the JUI aligned itself with the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) that came to power. The JUI’s newfound access to corridors of power also allowed it to establish close links with the Army, the ISI and politicians of all hues. Maulana Fazlur Rehman, the head of the JUI was made the Chairman of the National Assembly’s Standing Committee for Foreign Affairs. In 1994, the Maulana visited the US and lobbied for the Taliban. He also managed to obtain financial aid for the Taliban from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States.
The capture of Kandahar by Taliban resulted in considerable logistical infrastructure support for it. Pakistan’s Para Military was deployed to help Taliban set up an internal wireless network for their commanders in the field. The Pashtun grid of the Army High Command forced the military and ISI’s decision to extend greater support to the Taliban. Taliban became Pakistan’s only alternative for Pakistan’s strategic interests in Afghanistan, particularly as President Rabbani had become closer to Pakistan’s rivals – Russia, Iran and India. Pakistan was also reluctant to trust Rabbani’s Army Chief Ahmed Shah Masood who had a running battle with the ISI since the 19980s.
Role of ISI in Taliban’s ResurgenceThe US praising Pakistan for its contribution to the ‘war on terror’ is difficult to comprehend. There is no denying a connection between the CIA, the ISI and the ISI’s long standing control over the Taliban. Drugs are a part of their operation. Opium cultivation and heroin production in Pakistan’s tribal belt adjoining Afghanistan was a vital offshoot of the ISI-CIA cooperation. The ISI continued to give military advice to the Taliban even after 9/11 and commencement of NATO operations in Afghanistan. Large convoys of rifles, ammunition, rocket propelled grenade launchers and explosives crossed from Pakistan into Afghanistan through safe passages provided by the ISI. When NATO launched OPERATION ANACONDA in 2002, many Taliban and Al Qaeda cadres took shelter in Waziristan, regrouped and launched attacks against US troops in Afghanistan. Under pressure from the West, Pakistan commenced operations against the terrorists in Jan 2003 and two months later there was an attempt on the life of General Musharraf. The conspiracy was believed to have been hatched in Waziristan.
In Apr 2004, the Pakistan Government and terrorists reached an understanding in Shakai, but Nek Mohammed, one of the parties to the Agreement, continued to fight. He was conveniently eliminated by the ISI. By Nov 2004, South Waziristan was cleared of terrorists and an understanding was established with the Ahmedzai Wazirs. Ever since, the theatre of operations shifted to North Waziristan. It is clear that Taliban could not have regrouped and refurbished on its own. Pakistan’s ISI has obviously been the architect of this revival.
The Pakistan-Taliban strategy is clearly to deny access and disrupt the operations of coalition forces, undermining the administrative and relief efforts even in secure areas to bring Kabul and the Coalition forces to their knees – as was the case of the British forces in Helmand. Pakistan’s involvement in revival of Taliban was visible in OPERATION MEDUSA launched by the NATO between 4th to 17th Sep 2006 where-in more than one thousand Taliban terrorists crossed over from Quetta, waved on by Pakistan Border Guards, used ammunition to the tune of 400,000 rounds of rifles and machine guns, 2000 rocket propelled grenades and 1000 mortar shells. Further ammunition dumps unearthed after the battle exposed an additional stock of one million rounds. Taliban could not have amassed this quantum of fire power without active support from Pakistan.
Conclusion
Most of the new generation of Taliban are all Pakistani and represent a revolt against the Government’s support to the US. They are led by young mullahs, are technology and media savvy and aim their jihad at the infidels occupying Afghanistan and those ruling Pakistan. They wish to cleanse Pakistan and turn it into a pure Islamic state. The Taliban have declared Waziristan as an Islamic emirate.
In three weeks of battle between local Taliban and mostly Uzbek Islamists, more than 260 foreigners were killed; a feat that the Army had failed to accomplish in operations spread over four years. The ISI and the Army have built up the Taliban in this area and they are now inexorably slipping out of control.
The operation to clear Lal Masjid in Islamabad started with the decision of the Islamabad Capital Development Authority demolishing the first of eighty mosques and madrassas illegally built on public land in Islamabad. The Jamia Hafsa was on this list and its students protested by seizing a public library situated between the madrassas and the Lal Masjid. Lal Masjid was a centre for Deobandis in Pakistan that provided fodder for the jihad in Afghanistan and Kashmir. Its links with the ISI were public knowledge and they made no secret of their Taliban, Al Qaeda sympathies. The Government’s accommodation of Lal Masjid’s open show of religious extremism was never more apparent than when the Sharia court set up by Abdul Rashid Ghazi, the mullah who controlled Lal Masjid, passed a fatwa against Niloufer Bhaktiar, the former Minister for Tourism, for hugging a parachute instructor. The turning point in the Lal Masjid episode came when its vigilante shock troops kidnapped seven Chinese nationals in Islamabad.
In a swift reaction to Lal Masjid operation, militant attacks on the military in NWFP and FATA increased causing massive casualties on the Pakistani Army. The backlash was concentrated in NWFP and FATA.
Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, the chief of LeT, now rechristened as the Jamaat-ul-Dawa (JUD) described the Lal Masjid assault as an operation against every mosque and religious seminary in Pakistan. General Musharraf’s policies and those of the ISI had back fired. However, no matter how bad the situation in Pakistan seems right now, the country will continue to be ruled by military-ISI combine. If an understanding is reached with the political establishment, the Army and the ISI will resort to back seat driving. In both the scenarios, the Islamists will be the winners.
